Raymond Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics (2008)

What is politics? What are the tasks of political theory/philosophy? Predominantly Kantian replies follow: “politics is applied ethics,” or “it is to develop an ideal theory of rights/justice.” Are these ways of thinking about politics that Raymond Geuss critiques in this volume. Invoking the belief systems, decision-making processes, and ideologies of real political agents in society, he demonstrates the inadequacies of all-encompassing, abstract theorizations with their purported universality. Instead, he starts from a different conception of politics as a skill, not entirely devoid of any theories or moralities but an art able to evoke different kinds of theories at different times depending all on the context. Whence he asks a set of questions about real human agents involved in politics, not an abstract conception of Man. The questions about abstract generalizations about human societies are transformed into and filled with concrete agents and their actions toward others—Who whom? Furthermore, such specifications, or rather contextual clarifications, are made to concepts like legitimacy, justice, rights, and equality, as well. Rather than starting from an idealized theory of society in full realization of a virtue then proceeding (rather unsuccessfully) to the evaluation of real political agents, realism inverts this sequence (sort of). From the consideration of existing social arrangements, actions, and motivations, it then utilizes certain evaluative concepts in full recognition of its historicality. By blanking out history and sociology, ideal theory commits to a certain universality (i.e. “our” moral intuitions) that turns out not only deficient in its own standard of generality but also its usefulness.

I read this work about two months ago. Not every single point made remains sharp in my mind (although comically enough I have memories of being “enlightened”). Yet most illuminating of Geuss’s critiques for me was one on conceptual innovation as one task of political theory. Employing concepts does not solve any problems; however, the concepts may clarify the nature of the problems by introducing an alternative way of looking at them. Utilizing a concept, he elaborates, at times entails accepting a certain theory in which the concept is embedded. For instance, employing the concept of a state as an abstract structure of power entails accepting a theory about a freestanding form of authority. The theory as proposed may prove itself insufficient once the state actually is established as a social reality and the purported source of authority in theorization questioned. However, when introduced as an idea, the concepts represent “as much an aspiration as a description” (45), clarifying the situation and guiding action. This chapter on conceptual innovation prompted me to start reading Political Innovation and Conceptual Change, a collection of essays on the historical development of concepts, their transformations and utilizations.